

**STATE OF VERMONT  
PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION**

**Docket No. 8880**

**Joint petition of NorthStar Decommissioning )  
Holdings, LLC, NorthStar Nuclear )  
Decommissioning Company, LLC, NorthStar )  
Group Services, Inc., LVI Parent Corporation, )  
NorthStar Group Holdings, LLC, Entergy )  
Nuclear Vermont Investment Company, LLC )  
And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., and any )  
Other necessary affiliated entities to transfer ) **August 30, 2017**  
Ownership of Entergy Nuclear Vermont )  
Yankee, LLC, and for certain ancillary )  
Approvals, pursuant to 30 V.S.A. sec. 107, 231, )  
and 232 )**

**PREFILED TESTIMONY OF  
MICHAEL O. HILL  
ON BEHALF OF  
CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION**

*Mr. Hill’s testimony addresses insurance and other risk transfer aspects of Petitioners’ plan to transfer liability for restoration and decommissioning at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station to NorthStar Decommissioning Holdings, LLC. He states that, although properly structured environmental liability transfers can provide significant public benefits in terms of cost and schedule certainty and even reduction – and he has advocated and assisted with many successful liability transfers over the past two decades (in several instances representing or otherwise acting on behalf of the federal government) – Petitioners have not demonstrated that their unprecedented transfer in the context of a nuclear power plant has the contractual, insurance and other risk transfer elements required to ensure that the work would be conducted in a manner that is cost-effective, timely or otherwise protective of the public good.*

*Problems that federal and state regulators have over the past two decades experienced or otherwise determined to avoid in the context of liability transfers with respect to conventional (i.e., non-nuclear) pollutants are in some cases plainly (and in others, likely) present in Petitioners’ proposal. These problems include: (1) the full release of the Transferor; (2) the absence of evidence that the Transferee is properly incentivized or adequately capitalized; (3) the absence of evidence of adequate insurance or other financial assurance; and (4) the lack of transparency required for regulatory review and oversight.*

1 **Q1. Please state your name, occupation and area of practice.**

2 A1. My name is Michael O. Hill, and I am Principal of Alba Risk Management  
3 Services, LLC. As an attorney, insurance broker, corporate officer and  
4 environmental trust officer, I have practiced in the relatively new and specialized  
5 area of environmental liability transfers – and related areas of environmental  
6 insurance and fixed-price contracting – for over 18 years, since virtually the  
7 inception of environmental liability transfers in the context of conventional (*i.e.*,  
8 non-nuclear) contaminants.

9 **Q2. On whose behalf did you prepare this testimony?**

10 A2. I prepared this testimony on behalf of the Conservation Law Foundation.

11 **Q3. Please describe your company, Alba Risk Management Services, LLC.**

12 A3. Alba Risk Management Services, LLC (“Alba”) is a multidisciplinary law  
13 firm and insurance brokerage that I founded in 2004, having previously  
14 practiced in this area solely as an attorney (as Partner in a large law firm) and  
15 then solely as an insurance broker (as Chair of Marsh, Inc.’s Environmental  
16 Practice). I am licensed as an attorney and as a surplus lines insurance broker,  
17 and Alba is licensed as a law firm and as a surplus lines insurance brokerage,  
18 enabling it to help insureds obtain environmental and other forms of surplus  
19 lines insurance.

20 Subject areas of Alba’s focus include military base, Superfund, RCRA and  
21 other “brownfield” transfers, cleanups and redevelopments, and its clients  
22 include public and private entities.

23 **Q4. Please summarize your work experience and educational background.**

24 A4. I began my legal career as a Law Clerk for the Honorable Albert W.  
25 Coffrin, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont. I later  
26 served as a Trial Attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), where I  
27 represented the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in environmental

1 enforcement actions and received DOJ's awards for Outstanding Service and  
2 Special Achievement.

3 I was later a Partner in a large Washington law firm, where, among other  
4 clients and beginning in 1998, I represented, and then joined as a Senior Vice  
5 President, TRC Companies, Inc., a large and publicly-traded engineering,  
6 remediation and construction management firm that was then a pioneer (and the  
7 nation's largest) user of environmental insurance to accomplish environmental  
8 liability transfers and guaranteed fixed-price cleanups ("GFPCs"). TRC's GFPCs  
9 were an early form of the liability transfer that Petitioners propose here, yet that,  
10 to my knowledge (see below at 12-13 & n.7), has never been done in the context  
11 of a nuclear plant. TRC's early successes (with its stock price rising more than  
12 tenfold between 1998 and 2002) were a major factor in establishing and growing  
13 the practice of environmental liability transfers.

14 I left TRC in 2002 to become National Leader and then Global Chair of  
15 Marsh, Inc.'s Environmental Practice, then the world's largest broker of  
16 environmental insurance, a critical component of virtually all large environmental  
17 liability transfers.

18 I created Alba in 2004 to offer clients a broader and more efficiently-  
19 provided range of risk management options (*e.g.*, GFPCs and environmental  
20 insurance) to accomplish transfers, remediation, redevelopment and other goals  
21 with respect to contaminated properties. Since Alba's inception, I have provided  
22 legal, brokering and/or consulting services to large private and public entities  
23 (including the U.S. Air Force) in a "Transferor" role similar to that of ENVY in  
24 this matter; and to the nation's largest "brownfield" developer and other  
25 developers (and, twice, the Air Force) in "Transferee" roles. I have informally  
26 and then formally (as their consultant and/or broker) advised the federal  
27 government with respect to environmental liability transfers since 2000.

28 From 2010 to 2012, and following my nomination by the White House  
29 Council on Environmental Quality and the U.S. Treasury Department, I left Alba

1 on a part-time basis to serve as Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel of  
2 the \$773M trust created by the U.S. Government, 15 State and Tribal  
3 Governments, and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court to remediate and redevelop the 89  
4 Properties left behind in the 2009 General Motors (“GM”) bankruptcy, then the  
5 largest industrial bankruptcy, largest brownfield project, and largest remediation  
6 and redevelopment trust in U.S. history. The GM Trust was also one of the  
7 largest environmental liability transfers in U.S. history.

8 From 2015 to 2016, I served on a part-time basis as Senior Counsel in the  
9 law firm of Primmer, Piper, Eggleston & Cramer, PC, establishing its District of  
10 Columbia office and working occasionally from its Burlington and Montpelier  
11 offices. I returned to Alba full-time in 2016 to devote a greater share of my time  
12 to insurance brokering, consulting and related services.

13 I have on several occasions been engaged to serve as an expert consultant  
14 and/or witness in judicial and/or administrative proceedings, addressing issues  
15 related to environmental insurance in the context of liability transfers.

16 I have published and spoken frequently on the subject of environmental  
17 liability transfers and related subjects (*e.g.*, GFPCs, environmental insurance and  
18 environmental trusts). I serve as an expert commentator for the International Risk  
19 Management Institute, and I serve on the Boards of the Chemical Waste  
20 Litigation Reporter, the EPA Administrative Law Reporter, and Vermont Law  
21 School. A copy of my professional profile is attached as Exhibit CLF-MOH-1,  
22 which also includes a list of various of my publications and presentations in this  
23 field.

24 I hold a B.A. from Williams College (1980), where I majored in Political  
25 Economy and focused largely on Environmental Studies; I attended Vermont Law  
26 School for my first year of law school (1981-82); and I graduated from Yale Law  
27 School (1984), where I served as an editor of the Yale Law Journal.

28 **Q5. Have you previously testified before the Vermont Public Utility Commission?**

29 A5. No.

1 **Q6. Are you presenting any exhibits to support your testimony?**

2 A6. Yes. The following Exhibits are included with my testimony:

3 Exhibit CLF-MOH-1 is my professional profile.

4 Exhibit CLF-MOH-2 contains highlighted excerpts of Petitioners' written  
5 responses to various of CLF's and the State's Discovery Requests,  
6 identified below.

7 Exhibit CLF-MOH-3 contains highlighted excerpts of insurance policies and  
8 the parent support agreement that Petitioners provided in response to  
9 CLF's and the State's Discovery Requests, identified below.

10 **Q7. Please summarize your testimony.**

11 A7. As reflected in papers that I have published and presentations given (*see*  
12 Exhibit CLF-MOH-1), I have long been a vocal advocate of environmental  
13 liability transfers, as I believe that – provided they are well structured – they are a  
14 proven means to accomplish cleanups with greater cost and schedule certainty  
15 (and typically even schedule and cost reduction, even after adding the cost for  
16 insurance and other risk transfers),<sup>1</sup> without compromising cleanup quality and  
17 while also promoting redevelopment efforts. *Id.*

18 I have helped government and private clients accomplish liability transfers  
19 that collectively today account for thousands of acres remediated and tens of  
20 thousands of jobs created.

21 However, I have seen many environmental liability transfers fail due to  
22 structural problems related to flaws in contractual incentives, insurance, and

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<sup>1</sup> Compare U.S. Army Environmental Command, *Tracking Performance on the Army's Performance-Based Contracts*, (May 16, 2006) (average costs savings from 42 GFPCs was 21% below government's estimated costs-to-complete), and R. Durant, *The Greening of the U.S. Military: Environmental Policy, National Security, and Organizational Change*, at 1 & n.4 (2007) ("average cleanup costs at closing [military] bases are typically 60 percent higher than estimated originally); *see also* EPA Inspector General, *EPA Should Increase Fixed-Price Contracting for Remedial Actions*, Rept. 13-P-0208 (March 28, 2013); N. Kosko *et al.*, *Performance-Based Acquisition: A Tool to Reduce Costs and Improve Performance at U.S. Army Environmental Remediation Sites*, ICEM07-7050 (2007).

1 failures in oversight. These flaws can result in the doubling, tripling or worse of  
2 cleanup costs as well as schedule, and result in the public ultimately paying for  
3 the cleanup as well as suffering from delays in redevelopment. Some of the  
4 structural problems plainly exist in this case, and, from publicly available  
5 information,<sup>2</sup> there is inadequate assurance with respect to other and likely  
6 problems.

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<sup>2</sup> Petitioners have withheld many documents (*e.g.*, the GFPC and core insurance policies) under claims of confidentiality. The confidentiality that Petitioners demand is appropriately not required in the BRAC model upon which Petitioners otherwise rely (*see, e.g., infra* at 11-12). Particularly in the absence of competitive bidding, claims of competitive disadvantage through disclosure are more than outweighed by the harm that non-disclosure agreements (“NDAs”) may cause by: (a) potentially causing unwarranted distraction and delay through potential or actual arguments over whether one may have departed from the Petitioner-demanded restrictions; and (b) preventing the public from learning facts that are critical to the transfer (including the Transferee’s financial incentives; financial viability; rights under the insurance policies; and other factors).

In its May 5, 2017 Motion for Approval of Special Protocol to Govern Parties’ Access to Highly Confidential Document, at 2, Transferee/NSDH states that, “[t]here are three to four companies that could perform the work necessary to decommission Vermont Yankee.” I am not aware of any competitive bidding having occurred for this transfer, nor am I aware of any such bidding that is foreseen. Certainly, in the absence of competition – and after a competition has resulted in a winning bid – claims of competitive disadvantage are insufficient to justify an NDA’s harmful impacts.

Regarding NSDH’s argument that its 900-item breakdown of sub-tasks would impair NSDH’s ability to compete at *other* sites, *id.*, NSDH could reduce its risk by reducing the number of pay-outs to a far smaller number. The disadvantage to NSDH, of course, would be that it would have to wait longer between payments. While this may cost NSDH something, it would also reduce the risks and the costs to the Trusts and public. Just some of the questions to which this Commission and the public should have clear answers are:

- If there was no competitive bidding for this work, why was there not, and how can the Commission be confident that NSDH’s financial, technical and other capabilities and approach offer the best protections that are reasonably available to the public?
- Under the GFPC, when NSDH is paid for a particular milestone that it completes at a cost that is below the budgeted cost, to what extent (and when) can NSDH distribute the profits to its owners or other third parties (*v.* retaining them to ensure NSDH has sufficient assets to meet later milestones that may go over-budget)? Under the best GFPC models, Transferees are paid only enough to cover their actual costs (and nothing in profit) until reaching final “No Further Action” status with respect to all of the work covered by the guaranteed fixed price.
- To what extent does NSDH have its own assets (and to what extent is it legally obligated to spend those assets) to cover costs that are in excess of the expected budgets?

1           From mistakes made in the context of two decades of transfers of  
2 liabilities for conventional pollutants, the federal government, state governments  
3 and others have gained experience. Lessons from these experiences should be  
4 considered in the context of the unprecedented, nuclear-related transfer proposed  
5 here.

6           Chief among the experience gained or principles otherwise held by  
7 governments in the context of transfers pertaining to conventional pollutants are  
8 that:

9           (I) The entity seeking to transfer environmental liabilities  
10 ("Transferor") should not be fully released from its liabilities.

11           Rather, following the Petitioner-cited model mandated by  
12 Congress and followed by the military in the context of  
13 transferring contaminated properties, the Transferor should remain  
14 liable to the government and public in case the Transferee fails for  
15 any reason. This model is not only required by statute for all  
16 military property transfers, but is also virtually always followed for  
17 transfers of non-military properties as well.

18           To my knowledge, no Transferor has ever been fully released in  
19 the context of a nuclear power plant, nor do I believe such a  
20 practice should start now. I believe that, were this Commission  
21 and the NRC to consult with either the U.S. Environmental  
22 Protection Agency ("EPA") or Department of Defense regarding  
23 their nearly 20 years of experience with environmental liability  
24 transfers, both would advise against approving Petitioners'  
25 proposal.

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1 If Transferor believes that the proposed liability transfer is  
2 protective of the public, Transferor should be willing to assume at  
3 least the same measure of risk that it is asking the public to assume  
4 voluntarily. Transferor would likely still benefit from the transfer  
5 (*see supra* at 5 & n.1) ... just not as much, and the public would  
6 not lose protections that may be critical to protection of human  
7 health and the environment (as well as to job creation).

8 (II) The Transferee must have: (A) meaningful contractual incentives  
9 (carrots *and* sticks) to complete the work at or below budget, on or  
10 ahead of schedule, and with high quality; and (B) sufficient  
11 financial assets to perform the work in its entirety irrespective of  
12 any delays or other problems with insurance or other third-party  
13 support. Absent such assets, Transferee is less likely to “feel (or  
14 feel threat of) the sticks” if it does not perform the work on  
15 schedule and on budget, and more likely to abandon the project at  
16 the point that it appears a loss may be suffered.

17 (III) The transfer must be supported by clear, integrated, and otherwise  
18 robust insurance and other financial assurances, again following  
19 models used by, among others, the military in the context of the  
20 military’s “BRAC” sites (defined below). Petitioners have  
21 provided no evidence of Cost Cap or Pollution Legal Liability  
22 (“PLL”) insurance, both of which are virtually always used for  
23 environmental liability transfers of any significant size. Moreover,  
24 the general liability policies and other assurance products that  
25 Petitioners *have* provided are plainly non-protective due to express  
26 pollution exclusions and/or other limitations.

27 (IV) The liability transfer must be made, and the performance of its  
28 objectives monitored, in a transparent manner, including with



1                    *advance* disclosure of the GFPC, insurance and other core  
2 documents (again, following the BRAC model), and with waivers  
3 in place to preclude barriers to oversight. As one step in assuring  
4 transparency, the State should be expressly identified as a  
5 beneficiary of any Trusts used to fund the work, with an express  
6 Trustee and Petitioner waiver, at least as to this Commission and  
7 the NRC, with respect to any claims of protections that might be  
8 used to delay or altogether prevent critical information from  
9 reaching these regulators and protectors of the public interest.

10                    In sum, there are significant shortcomings with the proposed plan to  
11 transfer liability for restoration (herein, also “remediation”) and decommissioning  
12 of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station from what Petitioners describe as  
13 Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC (“ENVY”) to NorthStar  
14 Decommissioning Holdings, LLC (“NSDH”).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Joint Petition, at 1 (December 16, 2016). In any review of this matter, it is important to identify the Transferee accurately – that is, as NSDH specifically – rather than following Petitioners’ course of vaguely referencing the Transferee as “NorthStar.” Referring to the Transferee as NorthStar seemingly yet inaccurately credits NSDH with the larger assets and the longer and broader experience of a broad family of NorthStar entities. *E.g.*, Dec. 16, 2016 Pre-Filed Testimony of Scott State. at A6 (“NorthStar is the nation’s largest remediation and demolition company;” “NorthStar has a full-time workforce of 3,500 employees;” and “NorthStar’s revenue in 2015 was over \$650 million”); Dec. 16, 2016 Pre-Filed Testimony of Jeffrey Adix (“NorthStar also has a comprehensive general liability policy with a coverage limit of \$27 million, and a pollution policy [sic] with a coverage limit of \$10 million”); *see also* DPS:NS.2-21, Petitioners’ Second Supplemental Response to the Vermont Public Service Department’s Second Set of Information Requests (contained within Exhibit CLF-MOH-2) (Petitioners response ignores the State’s request for information regarding *NSDH’s* financial assets and instead provides information solely regarding NSGH and NSGS, then refers vaguely to “NorthStar”).

Related to the unnecessary complexity regarding which entity is doing what (and when) in this transaction, Petitioners themselves appear to have erred on p. 1 of their Petition, stating that that ENVY alone will be transferred to NorthStar whereas, at least per the same page of the Petition, ENVY *and* ENOI (as Entergy VY) *together* hold the Certificate of Public Good (“CPG”).

Whether intended or not, complexity in environmental liability transfer projects have an unfortunate history, *e.g.*, *In Re. Tronox*, 503 B.R. 239 (Bankr. Ct., S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2013), and it should be avoided.

1           In particular, the Commission should be concerned by the proposed full  
2 release not only of the Transferor (ENVY) but also of consequent releases of any  
3 ENVY parent, affiliate, or other entity that may currently share such liability<sup>4</sup>); by  
4 the lack of public information regarding the financial resources of NSDH itself  
5 and of information regarding the liability transfer contract and the incentives it  
6 carries; by clear flaws in the insurance and other financial assurance tools that  
7 *have* been disclosed; by the lack of information concerning other tools that  
8 Petitioners have identified by name but not disclosed; and by the lack of  
9 transparency that would enable the public to evaluate the proposed transfer and  
10 ongoing performance of the work. As discussed below, especially in the context  
11 of a liability transfer to a Transferee that is not also operating the facility as an  
12 ongoing concern (*e.g.*, another utility), these flaws could well lead to a doubling,  
13 tripling or even more of the costs and schedule, and to burdening the public with  
14 the costs, the delays, and the lack of redevelopment.

15           For those reasons and others, Petitioners have not shown that the proposed  
16 transfer would promote the public good.

17 **Q8. How is your testimony organized?**

18 **A8.**           My testimony tracks the subjects identified under headings I – IV of my  
19 prior answer. In its final pages, my testimony recommends a path forward toward  
20 a liability transfer that I believe *could* provide sufficient assurances of its serving  
21 the public good by expediting the cleanup and redevelopment while keeping costs  
22 at or below budget.

23 **Q9: Please proceed through the above-described Sections I – IV.**

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<sup>4</sup> Absent Petitioners' demonstration of facts dispositively exonerating ENVY's parent and other affiliates from liability, *see, e.g., U.S. v. Bestfoods*, 524 U.S. 51, 55 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1881 (1998) (“corporate parent that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of the facility itself may be held directly liable in its own right as an operator of the facility”), any release of ENVY would seem to present risks that run even beyond those of the loss of ENVY as a potentially liable party. I am aware of no such facts. Unless the Commission is aware of such facts, then for this additional reason, I believe that any release of Transferee would likely not be in the public's interest.

1    **A9:**

2        I.        **The Transferor Should Not Be Fully Released From Its Liabilities.**

3                As noted, to my knowledge, no regulator (federal or state) has ever fully  
4        released a Transferor of liability for contamination at a nuclear power plant.  
5        Were this Commission to be the first, Vermont would set a high-risk precedent for  
6        other states.

7                Even in the context of conventional pollutants, to my knowledge, the  
8        federal government has only once (in 1998, at the very inception of environmental  
9        liability transfers) fully released a Transferor from its liabilities, and state  
10       governments have granted such a release only twice. (*See infra* at 12-13 n.7)  
11       The circumstances of those cases differ from those here; such a transfer is  
12       expressly (even statutorily) proscribed in the context of military sites; and  
13       experience gained from at least one of those sites demonstrates the increased risks  
14       inherent in such a release.

15               In discovery, CLF asked Petitioners to admit that the full release sought  
16       here – where the NRC and State would not be able to seek coverage for cost  
17       overruns from the Transferor (or, for that matter, from “any Entergy entity”) – is  
18       almost entirely unprecedented in the United States for any site that is  
19       contaminated by conventional pollutants, and that it is entirely unprecedented for  
20       any nuclear power station. CLF:JP1-48 (contained within Exhibit CLF-MOH-2).

21               Petitioners denied the request, stating that,

22                        The Base Closure and Realignment Commission has used the  
23                        property transfer approach to transfer such sites to the private  
24                        sector for redevelopment (in some cases as housing units), with the  
25                        acquirer assuming all liabilities.

26        *Id.* (Petitioners’ Response to CLF:JP1-48).

27                The Base Closure and Realignment Commission approach described by  
28        Petitioners is commonly referred to as the Base Realignment and Closure

1 (“BRAC”) program through which the U.S. Department of Defense is statutorily  
2 authorized to transfer contaminated surplus military bases to the private sector.  
3 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(C).

4 Yet, in fact, under unambiguous statutory restrictions that are uniformly  
5 applied – and that, as a matter of custom and practice, I have never seen  
6 questioned – BRAC transfers do not involve a release of the Transferor.<sup>5</sup> Rather,  
7 the Transferor expressly remains liable to regulators. The BRAC model should  
8 be followed here with respect to retention of Transferor liability (and, for reasons  
9 stated below, the BRAC model should also be followed to address factors covered  
10 in Sections II through IV).

11 Focusing for now on the Section I issue (Transferor Release), although it  
12 is true that the BRAC model enables the military to transfer liability *to* a  
13 Transferee that then becomes jointly and severally liable for the cleanup, the  
14 Transferor remains liable as well.<sup>6</sup> The Transferor and Transferee thus share  
15 liability, and regulators can look at least sequentially to *either* entity to perform  
16 the cleanup (leaving Transferor with only a contractual right against the  
17 Transferee for indemnification).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(ii)(II) (Transferor/military must warrant that “any additional remedial action found to be necessary after the date of such transfer shall be conducted by the United States”); 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(C)(iv) (“A deferral under this subparagraph shall not increase, diminish, or affect in any manner any rights or obligations of a Federal agency ... with respect to a property transferred”).

<sup>6</sup> 42 U.S.C. 9607(e)(1) (“No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance shall be effective to transfer *from* the owner or operator of any ... facility or *from* any person who may be liable under this section, to any other person the liability imposed under this section. Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability under this section.”) (emphasis added).

<sup>7</sup> As noted above, to my knowledge, the federal government – which in such matters acts through the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) – has only once in any context (BRAC or otherwise) provided a Transferor with a full release, and that was in 1998 when environmental liability transfers were just beginning, it did not involve a BRAC site and it involved circumstances that are not present here. *U.S. v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc.*, Civ. No. S-91-1167 (E.D. Calif. Dec. 8, 2000). To my knowledge, EPA has never again provided such a release, e.g., *U.S. v. Mattiace Industries*, No. 03-CV-1101, slip op. at 9-10, 34-

1           The lessons learned and non-Release principles that apply to transfers of  
2           conventional pollutants should be applied with at least as much force in the  
3           context of transfers of nuclear plants given their generally greater complexity,  
4           duration and risks.

5           As noted, to my knowledge, the full release that is sought by Petitioners  
6           has never been granted for any Transferor in the context of the decommissioning  
7           or restoration of a nuclear plant. Rather, in what I understand are the only two  
8           instances where a liability transfer of any kind was applied, the transfer was  
9           expressly limited.<sup>8</sup>

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35, and 49 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2003) (expressly preserving EPA’s right to seek future cleanup costs from Transferors if Transferee is deficient in its performance), and States have done so on only two occasions. *E.g., State of Maine v. U.S. and Settling Nonfederal Defendants*, No. 00-64-B-C (D. Me. May 30, 2000).

In an article that I wrote in 2003 at the request of the National Association of Attorneys General, although I advocated the use of GFPCs and accompanying liability transfers, I stated that, despite the one federal and one (at that point) State full release that had been granted, Transferors should not expect and should not need a complete release from their liabilities. M. Hill, *A Tale of Two Sites: How Insured Fixed-Price Cleanups Expedite Protections, Reduce Costs, And Help The SEC, The EPA, And The Public*, 18 Nat’l. Env’tl. Enf’t. Jnl. No. 8, at 4, 9 & nn. 7, 9 (Sept. 2003), modified and re-published with permission from article originally published in 45 Chem. Waste Litig. Rptr. 907 (May 2003).

<sup>8</sup> At the first such transfer – the Zion nuclear plant in Illinois – the operating license and liabilities appears to have been merely temporarily transferred to a third-party, and never fully transferred from the Transferor. This limitation may prove to be critical, because by January 2015 concerns arose that the Zion Transferee may run out of funds to complete the work. *Exelon: Company Dismantling Zion Nuclear Plant is Running Out of Money*, (Jan. 9, 2015, Chicago Tribune), <http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-zion-plant-111-biz-20150109-story.html>.

With respect to the second such transfer – the La Crosse reactor in Wisconsin – my understanding is that the Transferee received merely a “possession-only license for the purpose of storage of nuclear materials and waste and decommissioning activities.” The Transferor “will remain the licensed owner of [the reactor] and hold title to and ownership of the real estate ... [and] the spent nuclear fuel ....” “Transferor will [also] retain financial responsibility for operation, maintenance, and security of the ISFSI and other related costs”). NRC *Cover Letter Transmitting Order Approving Transfer of the License for the LaCrosse Reactor* (May 20, 2016).

I want to make clear that I am not expert in the history of attempted or actual liability transfers in the context of nuclear plants. My hope is to provide in the nuclear context knowledge gained from the nearly two decades of experience with attempted and actual transfers of liability for *conventional* pollutants.

1 I am aware of no reason why the Commission should in this instance  
2 depart from restrictions mandated by Congress in the context of federal facilities  
3 for all pollutants, nor any reason why the Commission should go further than the  
4 two instances where *limited* transfers were allowed in the nuclear context, and the  
5 following sections underscore several additional reasons why the Commission  
6 should not so depart.


7 **(II) For purposes of assuring appropriate incentives as well as capability, the**  
8 **Transferee must show in advance the guaranteed fixed-price contract as well**  
9 **as sufficient financial assets to meet the liabilities transferred.**

10 In any environmental liability transfer, it is critical that the Transferee  
11 have: (A) robust carrot *and* stick contractual incentives that are consistent with the  
12 public good; and (B) the financial assets to meet its obligations (and thus to be  
13 meaningfully incentivized by the potential “stick”).

14 A. Contractual Incentives.

15 Although there is some flexibility in this, GFPCs are generally best  
16 structured so that the Transferee is given access to the full amount of the agreed  
17 fixed price of the cleanup – typically set at a 70% or higher confidence level –  
18 receiving that amount in portions as large but measurable milestones are reached,  
19 even if the final milestone is reached before the Transferee has incurred costs  
20 equal to the full amount of the agreed price (and without any profit received until  
21 the Transferee’s final obligations have been met in their entirety).

22 Perhaps the best example of such an incentive system is reflected in the  
23 following Figure, using (for purposes of illustration and discussion only) a  
24 hypothetical site with an agreed fixed price of \$100M.



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In the above scenario, the Contractor (which can, but need not, be the same as the Transferee) will receive the full amount of the escrowed \$100M even if it completes the cleanup at a lower cost, enabling the Contractor/Transferee to realize a profit far greater than a typical time-and-materials contract, which, for work in the context of conventional environmental cleanups, is typically on the order of 13%. These incentives are the “carrots.”

If the costs exceed the expected \$100M, the Contractor itself must face significant “sticks,” bearing the full cost of the next 20% invoiced (here, \$20M), which, assuming a normal profit rate of 13% profit, might cost the Contractor \$17.4M, exceeding the \$13M in profit earned on the first \$100M in work, and thus “breaking even,” at about the point that total invoices reach \$115.3M.

Under such a model, the Contractor has a 70% chance of making \$13M or more (possibly much more) on the project, and chances that, at least in the

1 conventional context, are on the order of 10-15% of any net loss, with a maximum  
2 net loss on the order of 6%.

3 The above equation applies to work on what are typically described as  
4 “Knowns” (described below, at 21 & n.15). In the event that “Unknowns” are  
5 encountered (*see id.* at n.16), the work would be largely covered by what’s known  
6 as a Pollution Legal Liability (or “PLL”) insurance policy, discussed in Section  
7 III. To discourage a Contractor from purposefully finding Unknowns (or  
8 mischaracterizing Knowns as Unknowns), terms for PLL policies are best set  
9 where the Contractor makes little to no profit from them.

10 The above model is provided solely for purposes of illustration. Its  
11 purpose is to demonstrate the importance of establishing a set of incentives that  
12 drives the Contractor/Transferee every day (from Day 1 and Dollar 1) to complete  
13 the cleanup at or below the agreed price, all while adhering to cleanup  
14 requirements as they are independently set by environmental regulators.

15 Given the importance of the Transferee’s incentives, CLF requested a  
16 copy of the liability transfer contract through which Transferee has committed to  
17 perform the work. CLF:JP.1-4, 1-36 and 1-47 (contained within Exhibit CLF-  
18 MOH-2) (seeking contract, including its Petitioner-referenced pay-item  
19 disbursement provisions). Petitioners have withheld this information (or at least  
20 that part of it through which NSDH assured that it would complete required  
21 decommissioning and restoration<sup>9</sup>). Indeed, as to the pay-item disbursements  
22 apparently contained within the contract, as late as May 5, Petitioners agreed to

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<sup>9</sup> To the best of my knowledge, Petitioners have withheld what they describe as the “Decommissioning Compliance Assurance Agreement” (“DCAA”), which is what Petitioners identify as the contract showing Transferee’s commitment to complete the decommissioning and restoration work by the end of 2030. *Id.* (Responses CLF:JP.1-4 and CLF-JP-2-1(a) (confirming that the DCAA was withheld). In addition, Petitioners have provided only a redacted copy of the “Membership Interest Purchase and Sale Agreement,” or “MIPA” to which the DCAA was apparently attached. Petitioners’ responses to CLF’s requests 1-36 and 1-47 indicate that Petitioners withheld the DCAA (and its Pay-Item Disbursement Schedule) on grounds of privilege and trade secret, respectively.



1 provide them to “non-State government agencies” and their experts only in the  
2 offices of NSDH’s counsel and only on the condition that no copies or even notes  
3 would be made. NorthStar Petitioners’ Motion for Approval of Special Protocol  
4 to Govern Parties Access to Highly Confidential Documents, at 6 (May 5, 2017).  
5 I have been involved in environmental liability transfers for over 18 years and  
6 have only once before seen a party even request confidentiality restrictions of this  
7 sort. As referenced above (at 6 n.2), I believe that receiving information under  
8 such conditions would likely result in more delay and distraction than  
9 improvement in decision, and it is not needed to identify the fundamental  
10 structural problems of the proposal. Even the seeking of such protections  
11 indicated to me a likelihood of distraction and detour (even under a more liberal  
12 NDA) that was not justified in the circumstances. For that reason, I declined to  
13 review any of the information that is claimed to be confidential. Again, in the  
14 BRAC context to which Petitioners have pointed, all contract information  
15 (including milestone payments) is made public; I have never seen a potential  
16 Transferee disadvantaged because of this mandate; and I do not think departing  
17 from that practice is justified here.

18 In this circumstance, this Commission and the NRC will be required to  
19 review core documents (such as the GFPC and insurance) only in the course of  
20 closed hearings and without the ability to inform the public about critical aspects  
21 of the transfer. Because environmental liability transfer agreements are a very  
22 narrow and specialized area of practice, Petitioners’ position has placed this  
23 Commission, the NRC and the public at a significant disadvantage.

24 Environmental liability transfers to Transferees receiving liability solely to  
25 perform the cleanup (v. operating the plant) are a relatively new and specialized  
26 field. The role that environmental insurance plays in them is particularly  
27 specialized, and there is little reason for any State, particularly Vermont, to defer  
28 to federal regulators with respect to it. The federal government is not the primary

1 regulator of insurance (states are<sup>10</sup>); the federal government generally does not  
2 even buy insurance;<sup>11</sup> and the State of Vermont has as much if not more expertise  
3 with respect to surplus lines and/or other manuscripted forms of insurance than  
4 any regulator, state or federal.<sup>12</sup> Additional reason for Vermont not to defer is  
5 that the transferred obligations extend beyond nuclear and to conventional  
6 pollutants.

7 B. Financial Assets.

8 Financial assets are important not only in ensuring the ability to complete  
9 the work but also in ensuring that a Transferee has appropriately strong incentives  
10 to complete it and have it remain protective over the long-run.

11 Transferees that are receiving liability not to operate the facility but only  
12 to clean it up are motivated (and therefore must be treated) differently than  
13 Transferees that will operate the facility (e.g., as a revenue-generating utility).  
14 For that reason, the Commission cannot rely on regulatory financial assurance  
15 requirements that were designed for operator-to-operator transfers. As has been  
16 stated by the State of Vermont and the NRC:

17 “The purpose of [the NRC’s] financial assurance is to provide a  
18 *second* line of defense, if the financial operations of the licensee  
19 are insufficient, by themselves, to ensure that sufficient funds are  
20 available to carry out decommissioning (63 FR 50465, 50473).”  
21

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<sup>10</sup> E.g., S. Sinder, *Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and State Regulation of the Business of Insurance – Past, Present and Future?* 5 UNC School of Law, N. Carol. Banking Inst. 49, 50 (2001) (“States have historically functioned as the virtually exclusive regulators of all insurance activities”).

<sup>11</sup> See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-04-261SP, *Principles of Federal Appropriations Law* 4-180 (2004).

<sup>12</sup> E.g., [www.vermontcaptive.com](http://www.vermontcaptive.com) (“Vermont is number one in gross written premium, number one in assets under management, and third in active captive insurance companies in the world,” and “48 of the Fortune 100 and 18 of the companies that make up the Dow 30 have Vermont captives” (State’s website, Homepage as of August 26, 2017)).

1 State of Vermont’s Petition for Leave to Intervene, NRC Dkt. No. 50-271-LT-2,  
2 at 8 & n.10 (June 13, 2017), *quoting* NRC, Questions and Answers on  
3 Decommissioning Financial Assurance, Enclosure 5, at 1 (ADAMS Accession  
4 No. ML111950031) (emphasis added).

5 Moreover, of course, whereas the State must look beyond  
6 decommissioning and to restoration, the NRC’s financial assurance requirements  
7 apply only to decommissioning requirements. *See id.* For that reason and others,  
8 the Commission cannot rely on NRC Financial Assurance Requirements alone to  
9 determine whether the Transferee will have sufficient resources.

10 One reason to distinguish a non-operating Transferee from an operating  
11 one is that, while a non-operating Transferee may have a significant profit  
12 incentive (a “carrot”) to complete the cleanup at a cost below the agreed fixed  
13 price, it would have far less if any “stick” incentive in the form of needing to  
14 spend its own assets to fulfill its promise of completing the work. This is  
15 because, once an undercapitalized non-operator Transferee’s costs exceed or  
16 appear likely to exceed the fixed price of the cleanup, the Transferee has no  
17 chance of making profit and is therefore more likely to declare itself bankrupt or  
18 otherwise walk away, leaving it to others to complete the work.

19 Given the importance of Transferee’s assets, Petitioners’ August 18, 2017  
20 response to the State’s recent efforts to obtain Transferee’s 2011 – 2016 audited  
21 financial statements is particularly important. In their response, Petitioners appear  
22 to have ignored completely the State’s request with regard to the Transferee itself  
23 (NSDH).<sup>13</sup> Instead, and only under confidentiality restrictions to which, for

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<sup>13</sup> Exhibit CLF-MOH-2, Joint Petitioners’ Second Supplemental Response to the Vermont Public Service Department’s Second Set of Information Requests, DPS:NS.2-21 (Aug. 18, 2017) (ignoring without explanation the State’s express request for audited financial statements for *NSDH* as well as *NSGH*, *NSGS* and *LVI Parent Corp.*, and instead providing information solely concerning *NSGH* and *NSGS*, then vaguely referring to “NorthStar’s” abilities without identifying *which* NorthStar entity to which the response refers). The lack of response concerning *NSDH*’s assets was not unimportant, as the State had already identified the issue of financial qualifications as important. State’s Reply in Support of its Petition

1 reasons stated above, I have not agreed, Petitioners have provided information  
2 only on NorthStar Group Holdings, LLC (“NSGH”) and NorthStar Group  
3 Services, Inc. (“NSGS”). Except to the extent that NSGH or NSGS will share in  
4 the Transferee’s liability beyond the limited protections offered by NSGS through  
5 the Parent Support Agreement (discussed below), any response providing NSGH  
6 or NSGS information in lieu of NSDH’s prevents meaningful review of the  
7 Transferee’s finances.

8 **(III) The transfer must be supported by clear, integrated, and otherwise**  
9 **robust insurance and other financial assurances.**

10 Even assuming that the amounts in the Nuclear Decommissioning Trust  
11 (“NDT”) and Site Restoration Trust (“SRT”) are reasonably anticipated to be  
12 sufficient in themselves to accomplish the work with respect to Known  
13 contaminants – an issue that I understand from State filings to be unsettled<sup>14</sup> – if  
14 the transfer is to follow the model of BRAC sites and other sites, and as discussed  
15 below (describing Cost Cap and PLL policies), it should be supported by  
16 insurance and other protections up to where the public is assured of the  
17 availability of *twice* the amount of funds expected to remediate the Known

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for Leave to Intervene, at 5 n.12 (July 17, 2017) (“[W]e haven’t made any conclusions about whether NorthStar is financially ... qualified to hold the license.”).

<sup>14</sup> See, e.g., State of Vermont’s Petition for Leave to Intervene in NRC Proceedings, NRC Dkt. No. 50-271-LT-2, at 3-4 (June 13, 2017). Focusing for now just on the non-radiological contamination, it appears that Petitioners have still not provided the State with a complete non-radiological site investigation and characterization report for the VY Site, creating “significant uncertainty regarding what is required and what it will ultimately cost to clean up non-radiological pollution and complete site restoration. Affidavit of Charles B. Schwer at 2, ¶¶ 8, 12 (June 12, 2017). As stated by Mr. Schwer, “Because the Vermont Yankee site has not been fully investigated and characterized for non-radiological contamination, there is a risk of cost overruns.” Id. at 2, ¶ 12.

Per the Affidavit of William Irwin, there appears also to be a significant risk of a shortfall in available funding to fully and safely decommission and radiologically decontaminate the site and manage its spent nuclear fuel, thus placing public health, safety and the environment at risk. Affidavit of William Irwin, at 2, ¶ 7 (June 9, 2017). According to Mr. Irwin, the investigation of and characterization of the site (non-radiological and radiological) has not yet occurred. Id. at 3, ¶ 7(a).

1 pollutants<sup>15</sup> and another equal amount or more available to address Unknowns.<sup>16</sup>  
2 Finally, it is important that the insurance and other assurance remain in place at  
3 least as long as the work is expected to continue.

4 As discussed below in response to CLF's request that Petitioners:

5 Identify all resources of NorthStar, including any letters of credit  
6 or insurance or other financial instruments that will be available to  
7 support the decommissioning and site restoration [be they mere  
8 drafts or even terms sheets],  
9

10 Exhibit CLF-MOH-2 (CLF:JP.1-33), Petitioners have identified virtually no Cost  
11 Cap or PLL coverages required for a BRAC or other transfer of liability for  
12 conventional pollutants, and the policies Petitioners did produce have express  
13 exclusions for conventional and/or nuclear pollutants and fail to protect the public  
14 in other respects as well. The only policy Petitioners produced that does cover  
15 pollution in any way is a *Contractor's* policy that, as discussed below (at 24-25),  
16 covers only those costs that result from the Contractor's errors or other actions.

17 Cost Cap Insurance. The type of insurance that is most important to an  
18 environmental liability transfer of significant size is commonly referred to as  
19 "Cost Cap." In a nutshell, Cost Cap insurance covers excess costs to address  
20 Known pollutants up to where the costs for Knowns reach to twice the amount  
21 estimated at the time that the insurance is purchased (or "2X").

22 In terms of duration, Cost Cap coverage typically begins at or shortly  
23 before the time of liability transfer and remains in effect for years, well past the  
24 time expected to complete the cleanup.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> "Known" contaminants are typically (and very roughly) described as those that are, at the time of contracting, known or reasonably expected to be required to be addressed through a pre-existing, government-mandated Scope of Work ("SOW") as well as those that are discovered in the course of executing the SOW even as it may evolve over time.

<sup>16</sup> Unknowns are typically defined to include contaminants that are not known or expected at the time of contracting, and are discovered during the policy period and outside of the course of executing the SOW.

1           From Petitioners’ responses to CLF’s discovery requests (and,  
2 specifically, in response to CLF:JP.1-33, it appears that Petitioners’ propose that  
3 the liability transfer be made without the use of any Cost Cap insurance.<sup>18</sup> Such a  
4 deficiency would, in my experience, lead federal regulators to reject a liability  
5 transfer in the context of a site contaminated with conventional pollutants.

6           Pollution Legal Liability Insurance. BRAC and other transfers of liability  
7 for conventional pollutants are also typically supported by at least an equal  
8 amount (*i.e.*, another X, or even 2X) of insurance to cover the cost of addressing  
9 Unknowns. Again, this insurance is typically referred to as Pollution Legal  
10 Liability (or “PLL”), and its coverage, too, typically begins at or shortly before  
11 the time of liability transfer and remains in effect well past the time expected to  
12 complete the cleanup. And, again, it appears from their discovery responses  
13 (specifically, CLF:JP.1-33), that Petitioners’ seek to make the liability transfer  
14 without any PLL protection. Such a deficiency would, in my experience, cause  
15 federal regulators to reject a proposed liability transfer in the context of a site  
16 contaminated with conventional pollutants.

17           The Importance of Commission Review of Cost Cap, PLL, and any other  
18 Surplus Lines Insurance. As discussed more thoroughly in Section IV, as a  
19 pre-condition of BRAC transfers, state and federal environmental regulators are  
20 given copies of the proposed Cost Cap and PLL policies so they may review the

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<sup>17</sup> Because traditional insurers exited the market for Cost Cap insurance in or around 2011, the Air Force and other entities that have executed liability transfers for conventional pollutants have needed to create and apply “Cost Cap Alternatives”) to satisfy regulators’ reasonable needs for assurance of cleanup completion. I have assisted the Air Force in two such post-Cost Cap transfers, in 2013 and 2015 (as well as others before 2011, using Cost Cap from traditional insurers). M. Hill, *Insured Fixed-Price Cleanups, Still Possible Even After Commercial Insurers’ 2011 Exit from The Cost Cap Market*, 70 Chem. Waste Litig. Rptr. 956 (Oct. 2015).

<sup>18</sup> It is possible that the ANI or NEIL policies that Petitioners did not mention in their discovery responses to CLF (but have vaguely referenced elsewhere) may provide some Cost Cap protections. We cannot tell. As discussed in Section IV, just as those coverages must be shown in advance and made publicly available in the Petitioner-cited BRAC model, they should be provided in advance here. It is my understanding, however, that the ANI and NEIL policies that might cover NSDH’s work do not yet even exist.

1 actual or prospective policy language for adequacy *before* providing their  
2 approval for the transfer.

3 Project-specific, regulatory review of policy language is particularly  
4 critical for environmental insurance, because – unlike the vast majority of other  
5 insurance (*e.g.*, General Liability, Auto, Homeowners) – environmental insurance  
6 is a “surplus lines” product whose textual terms are not subject to regulatory  
7 review by State Insurance Commissioners or any other regulator. Among other  
8 terms, regulators must be assured that the policies:

- 9 • include the governments as Named Insureds;
- 10 • are reasonably assignable should the Transferee fail and the work  
11 needs to be completed by others;
- 12 • cannot be cancelled or even modified without prior regulator consent;  
13 and
- 14 • do not contain other terms that undercut protections to the public.

15 Environmental insurance policies are generally quite complex – typically over 50,  
16 100, or even several hundred pages – and each policy must be reviewed to the  
17 same degree as any other individual (and customized) contract of similar  
18 complexity and significance. In a typical environmental liability transfer, policy  
19 negotiation and manuscripting takes months (and multiple drafts), much the same  
20 as other contracts of similar magnitude and complexity.

21 The need for such policy review by regulators is implicitly statutorily  
22 mandated at BRAC sites, because BRAC transfers of contaminated properties  
23 cannot take place unless the Governor of the host state has determined that the  
24 protections are sufficient to assure that the transfer will “not substantially delay  
25 any necessary [remediation] at the property.” 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(C)(i)(IV).

1 For BRAC properties that are on the National Priorities List (“NPL”), approval is  
2 required not only by the Governor but also by the Administrator of the EPA.<sup>19</sup>

3 The same or greater degree of review must be required in the context of a  
4 nuclear plant, where the liabilities sought to be transferred are of at least the same  
5 magnitude in terms of anticipated complexity, cost and risks to human health and  
6 the environment. Yet, as seen from their response to CLF’s discovery requests, it  
7 appears that Petitioners have not obtained (much less provided for inspection)  
8 either of the above types of policies or similar protections. The policies that  
9 Petitioners *have* provided are not adequately protective, for reasons described  
10 below:

11 Contractor Pollution Liability: A policy that Petitioners describe as a  
12 \$10M “pollution policy”<sup>20</sup> was provided but is inadequate for any of several  
13 reasons:

- 14 • First, the policy is not a “pollution policy” as people in the field typically  
15 apply that term, but is a *Contractors* Pollution Liability (“CPL”) policy,  
16 essentially covering only those costs that are caused or exacerbated by the  
17 Contractor’s actions or errors (much the same as a doctor’s malpractice  
18 policy might cover health care costs that are caused or exacerbated by the  
19 doctor’s negligence but not those that must be incurred for other  
20 reasons).<sup>21</sup>

21  
22 A true pollution policy, by contrast – at least as that term is commonly  
23 used in the world of environmental liability transfers including but not

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<sup>19</sup> *Id.* As noted, on behalf of the Air Force, I have negotiated insurance policies for four BRAC transfers of NPL Property (in 2007, 2010, 2013 and 2015), each of which obtained regulatory approval, and the last two of which required us to create a customized alternative to Cost Cap insurance in light of traditional insurers’ 2011 exit from the Cost Cap market. The 2015 article that I wrote (*see supra* at 22 n.17) describes those policies and their public benefits.

<sup>20</sup> Dec. 16, 2016 Prefiled Testimony of Jeffrey Adix, at A7; Petitioners’ April 26, 2017 Responses to CLF’s Discovery Requests, at A: CLF:JP.1-44.

<sup>21</sup> *See* Bates Page NS-VYND 0050080, contained as part of Petitioners’ Attachment A.DPS.NS.1-39.2, highlighted excerpts of which are attached hereto within Exhibit CLF-MOH-3. Zurich’s formal name for a CPL is “Professional Environmental Consultant’s Liability Insurance Policy.” *Id.* at 0050076.



1 limited to BRAC property transfers – refers to a PLL policy or possibly a  
2 Cost Cap, and thus applies to a far broader range of pollution-related costs  
3 than those that were caused or exacerbated by the Contractor.  
4

- 5 • Second, the CPL policy was merely a one-year policy, it expired on July 1,  
6 2017, and thus does not cover any part of the period of the expected  
7 cleanup at the VY site. *Id.* at Bates Page NS-VYND 0050076. A  
8 precondition of transferring environmental liabilities at BRAC and other  
9 contaminated properties is the production of a policy that will be effective  
10 on the date of transfer and is expected to last in duration well beyond the  
11 expected time of the cleanup.  
12
- 13 • Third, the CPL policy excludes coverage for claims that are based upon or  
14 arise out of pre-existing conditions that are known to any of the insureds  
15 and that could reasonably expect to result in a claim. *Id.* at 0050081, at ¶  
16 III.A;  
17
- 18 • Fourth, the CPL policy is neither issued in the name of (nor controlled by)  
19 the proposed Transferee (NSDH) but in and by NSGS, and access to the  
20 Policy’s \$10M in limits is shared by 25 Additional Named Insureds, none  
21 of which is NSDH, and on projects that span far beyond the Vermont  
22 Yankee site, if it includes the Vermont Yankee site at all. *Id.* at 0050076  
23 (Declaration Item 1) and 0050113-14 (Endorsement 13).  
24
- 25 • Fifth, it is not clear that the CPL Policy covers even the majority of  
26 NSDH’s services (decommissioning or restoration), but is instead intended  
27 primarily to cover services of a consulting nature as opposed to active  
28 remediation. *Id.* at 0050109-10 (Endorsement 11).<sup>22</sup>  
29

30 General Liability. Petitioners have also produced (as Attachment  
31 A.DPS.NS.1-38.2) what they have described as a “General Liability” policy.  
32 Excerpts are attached within Exhibit CLF-MOH-3 (*e.g.*, Bates NS-VYND  
33 0049870). This policy, too, provides virtually none of the Cost Cap or PLL  
34 protections required at BRAC and other sites that are the subject of environmental  
35 liability transfers, and it is inadequate and/or even inapplicable for other reasons  
36 as well:

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<sup>22</sup> This is not an exhaustive list of the inadequacies of the CPL policy, but identifies the policy’s primary shortcomings.

- 1           • First, it expressly excludes coverage for claims related to conventional  
2 pollutants or hazardous properties related to nuclear and/or radioactive  
3 material. *See id. at* Bates Pages NS-VYND 0049901, 0049937 and  
4 0049949.  
5  
6           • Second, it, too, was merely a one-year policy, it expired on July 1, 2017,  
7 and thus does not cover any part of the period of the work. *Id.* at 0049870.  
8  
9           • Third, it, too, is neither issued in the name of (nor controlled by) the  
10 proposed Transferee (NSDH) but in and by NorthStar Group Services,  
11 Inc., *id.*, and its limits are shared by an undisclosed (because “redacted”)  
12 number of Additional Named Insureds, none of which, as far as can be  
13 told from the copy produced, is NSDH. *Id.* at 0049870, 0049982-83.

14           Excess Liability. The insurance policy that Petitioners identified in their  
15 testimony is described as an “Excess Liability” policy is in fact three separate  
16 policies.<sup>23</sup> For several reasons, none of the three provides insurance that is  
17 adequate (and in some cases may be irrelevant):  
18

- 19           • First, all three expressly exclude coverage for claims related to pollutants  
20 that are conventional or nuclear in nature.<sup>24</sup>  
21  
22           • Second, none is specific to the Transferee (NSDH) but, rather, are in the  
23 name of NSGS or NSGH, entities that, absent circumstances of which I  
24 am unaware, are not liable for the work and thus could not claim under the  
25 policies.<sup>25</sup>  
26

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<sup>23</sup> Dec. 16, 2016 Testimony of Jeffrey Adix, at A7; *see also* Petitioners’ April 26, 2017 Response to CLF’s 1<sup>st</sup> Set of Discovery Requests, at Answer 1-45 (contained within Exhibit CLF-MOH-2). Excerpts of all three Excess policies are contained within Exhibit CLF-MOH-3 and identified as Attachments A.DPS.NS.1-37.3 (\$15M Zurich Policy); A.DPS.NS.1-37.4 (\$25M Great American Assurance Company Policy); and A.DPS.NS.1-37.5 (\$10M AIG Policy).

<sup>24</sup> Exhibit CLF-MOH-3, Zurich Policy (A.DPS.NS.1-37.3) at NS-VYND 0049651 - 0049653 (pollution and nuclear exclusions, respectively); Great American Policy (A.DPS.NS.1-37.4), at 0049684 and 0049700 (pollution exclusion) and 0049703 (nuclear exclusion); and AIG Policy (A.DPS.NS.1-37.5), at 0049713 (pollution exclusion).

<sup>25</sup> Exhibit CLF-MOH-3, Zurich Policy (A.DPS.NS.1-37.3) at 0049641; Great American Policy (A.DPS.NS.1-37.4), at 0049677; and AIG Policy (Attachment A.DPS.NS.1-37.5), at 0049709.

- 1           • Third, all of the policies were for one year only, and they expired July 1,  
2           2017. *Id.*

3  
4           \$125M Support Agreement. In addition to the identified insurance  
5 policies, Petitioners have pointed to a \$125M “Support Agreement Between  
6 NorthStar Group Services, Inc. and NorthStar Vermont Yankee, LLC,” the latter  
7 being the name that ENVY is anticipated to take after ENVY has been transferred  
8 to NSDH.<sup>26</sup> The Support Agreement would be considered inadequate for a  
9 BRAC or other transfer of contaminated property for any of several reasons:

- 10           • First, \$125M is likely insufficient in amount. As noted above, transfers of  
11 contaminated BRAC sites (and other sites) typically have cost overrun  
12 protection to where costs are covered up to twice the expected cost of full  
13 remediation for Knowns, with another policy of at least an equal amount  
14 for Unknowns. According to Petitioners pleadings in the NRC  
15 proceedings, assets in the Vermont Yankee NDT had a market value of  
16 approximately \$562 million as of December 31, 2016.<sup>27</sup> Assuming that  
17 this is roughly on the order of a conservatively high estimate of costs  
18 required to address the Knowns, \$125M would be grossly insufficient to  
19 obtain regulatory approval for a liability transfer pertaining to  
20 conventional pollutants, where regulators appropriately expect insurance  
21 and other protections (e.g., deductibles and co-pays) to cover costs to  
22 where the Knowns are twice what was expected at the time of transfer.  
23 *See supra* at 15, 21.  
24  
25           • Second, and particularly important for the Commission given its focus on  
26 conventional contaminants, it is unclear that the \$125M Support  
27 Agreement’s purpose extends beyond decommissioning (although, in  
28 fairness, it does also reference costs required for “maintaining” the site  
29 and “protecting the public health and safety.”) Further indication that the  
30 Agreement’s purpose is limited to decommissioning is that the Agreement  
31 can be modified by providing notice only to the NRC, without offering  
32 similar protections to the State of Vermont. Exhibit CLF-MOH-3,

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<sup>26</sup> Joint Petition at 1, and 3 ¶ 2; *see also* Prefiled Testimony of Jeffrey Adix, at A6; and of Scott State, at A23 and A56. A full copy of the unsigned Parent Support Agreement as produced by Petitioners (as Enclosure 6 to JP-SES-SUPP-1), is attached at the end of Exhibit CLF-MOH-3.

<sup>27</sup> Applicants’ Answer Opposing June 13, 2017 State of Vermont’s Petition for Leave to Intervene, at 33 (July 10, 2017).

1 Support Agreement at 2, ¶ 4 (produced as Enclosure 6 to JP-SES-SUPP-  
2 1).

- 3
- 4 • Third, the Agreement states that, except for certain protections provided  
5 therein to the NRC, the Agreement is not intended for the benefit of any  
6 person other than the parties to the Agreement (which do not include the  
7 State of Vermont).
  - 8
  - 9 • Finally, the Support Agreement is not signed and thus does not reflect a  
10 binding commitment. Again, looking at BRAC and other sites,  
11 contractual commitments of this sort are typically provided to regulators in  
12 a form that reflects binding commitments. While the commitments may  
13 be contingent upon the actual transfer of the property, the commitment is  
14 in effect immediately upon transfer.

15

16 Letter of Credit. In December 16, 2016 Prefiled Testimony filed  
17 on behalf of Petitioners, Scott State, CEO of NorthStar Group Services, Inc.,  
18 Petitioners stated that “NorthStar VY will obtain a contingent letter of credit  
19 in the amount of \$25 million, payable to a secondary decommissioning  
20 compliance trust to be formed ....” (Testimony of S. State, at A23). The  
21 identified letter of credit (“LOC”) should not be relied upon, for several  
22 reasons:

- 23
- 24 • First, given Mr. State’s description of the LOC as payable to a  
25 *decommissioning* compliance trust, then (similar to the \$125M Support  
26 Agreement), one cannot know whether the LOC assets may be used  
27 for restoration.
  - 28 • Second, the LOC was withheld under claim of privilege or other  
29 protection. As set forth below, and again using Petitioners’ analogy,  
30 were this a BRAC transfer, the LOC would need to be produced in a  
31 form upon which regulators and the public can rely.

32

33 Bonds. In pre-filed testimony filed on behalf of Petitioners, NSGS  
34 Vice President and Chief Financial Officer Jeffrey Adix testified that  
35 “NorthStar” has obtained “more than \$250 million in performance bonds since  
36 2014 to provide additional assurance of project completion when required.”  
37 December 16, 2016 Prefiled Testimony of J. Adix at A7. Similarly, NSGS

1 Chief Executive Officer Scott State stated in his Prefiled Testimony that  
2 “NorthStar” “commits to provide, and will require its teaming partners to  
3 provide, appropriate performance bonds (or insurance, where appropriate)  
4 issued by Treasury-rated surety companies to guarantee the performance of  
5 the tasks.” State Testimony at A56.

6 As stated above (at 9 n.3), Petitioners’ use of the term “NorthStar”  
7 in this manner is virtually meaningless, and cannot be relied upon.

8 Further, despite CLF’s Discovery Request 33 for all “letters of  
9 credit or insurance or other financial instruments that will be available to  
10 support the decommissioning and site restoration [be they mere drafts or even  
11 term sheets],” Petitioners provided no such bonds or even drafts or term  
12 sheets, thus preventing public review of them.

13 **(IV) The liability transfer must be made, and the performance of its**  
14 **objectives monitored, in a more transparent manner.**

15 Information sufficient to establish each of the above factors should  
16 be provided to this Commission, the NRC and the public, so that each is  
17 assured that the proposed liability transfer will in fact result in  
18 decommissioning and remediation that is on budget, on time, and otherwise  
19 done in a manner most likely to result in redevelopment and associated job  
20 growth. To date, Petitioners have withheld almost all such information, even  
21 final two-party contracts, claiming privilege or other reasons (*e.g.*, that it  
22 would hurt Transferee’s competitive position).

23 Although Petitioners’ competitiveness argument is not completely  
24 without merit, as noted above, in my nearly 20 years of experience in this  
25 field, I have never seen such “pirating” of others’ data ever tried (much less  
26 ever have any effect). More importantly, any such risk to Petitioners is more  
27 than outweighed by the public’s need to know that they will not be saddled  
28 with the remaining decommissioning and restoration costs or with a long-

1 shuttered facility preventing redevelopment, and by the public interest in  
2 avoiding distraction and delay. *See supra* at 6 n.2.

3 Again turning to the BRAC process as a model, GFPC contracts  
4 (including Milestone payments within the contracts) are provided not only to  
5 regulators (*e.g.*, the Governor of the hosting state; the Administrator of the  
6 EPA) but also to the local City, County or other governmental entity, so the  
7 amounts set forth within the individual Milestones can be reviewed for  
8 reasonableness. This is true even where, as here, the Transferor and  
9 Transferee have opted to break down the costs into well over 100 milestone  
10 payments.<sup>28</sup>

11 In addition to receiving the above information in advance, this  
12 Commission and the NRC should be assured of access by them to relevant  
13 information as the work takes place, through the time of completion. This  
14 Commission and the NRC should not only be expressly identified as  
15 beneficiaries (or entities acting on behalf of beneficiaries) of the NDT, SRT  
16 and any other trust of similar vehicles used to hold or support  
17 decommissioning or restoration funds, but it should also be stated expressly  
18 that, as beneficiaries or representatives thereof, this Commission and the NRC  
19 will have access to all relevant information related to the progress of the work,  
20 even information that is arguably privileged or otherwise protected.

21 Such access is normally granted to beneficiaries. *See U.S. v.*  
22 *Jicarilla Apache Nation*, 564 U.S. 162, 165, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2318 (2011)  
23 (“The common law ... has recognized an exception to the [attorney-client]  
24 privilege when a trustee obtains legal advice related to the exercise of  
25 fiduciary duties. In such cases, courts have held, the trustee cannot withhold

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<sup>28</sup> As discussed *supra* at 6 n.2, Petitioners could mitigate any perceived threat to their competitive data by reducing the number of payments, thus providing less detail to third parties. If, for example, ten Milestones were coalesced into one larger Milestone, Petitioners’ risk of sharing competitive detail would be reduced.

1 attorney-client communications from the beneficiary of the trust.”); U.S.  
2 Department of Justice’s Petition for Certiorari in *Jicarilla*, at 21 (“A common-  
3 law fiduciary is under a duty to communicate to the beneficiary material facts  
4 affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does  
5 not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection in  
6 dealing with a third person.”). That said, in the same case where the  
7 Department of Justice and Supreme Court noted the general exception to the  
8 attorney-client privilege, the government argued and the Court held that the  
9 exception did not apply in the context of that trust, thus enabling the federal  
10 government, despite its Trustee status, to withhold information from the  
11 beneficiary itself (the Jicarilla Apache Nation).

12 Given that precedent, this Commission should condition any  
13 issuance of a CPG on Petitioners’ and any required Trustees’ express  
14 agreement that the Commission and other regulators will be given access to all  
15 relevant information and that arguments of privilege or other protections will  
16 not apply to prevent or even to delay such access.<sup>29</sup>

17 **Q10. Do you believe that the proposed transfer should not take place?**

18 A.10 It should not take place as proposed. As noted, I have long (since 1998) been  
19 an advocate of liability transfers in the context of environmental cleanups, and  
20 I continue to be. When structured well, such transfers are far more likely to  
21 promote the public good than would a conventional (*e.g.*, time-and-materials)  
22 approach to cleanup contracting. That said, when structured poorly, liability  
23 transfers are very much worse for the public, capable of doubling or even  
24 tripling the costs and time required for completion.

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<sup>29</sup> Although there may be circumstances where the need for protections outweighs the need for *public* access to information, any argument that Petitioners might make to prevent or delay providing information to this Commission and the NRC would almost certainly be outweighed by the need for these regulators to review the information.

1                   Perhaps the most essential component of a liability transfer is that  
2                   the Transferor remain liable to regulators in the event of Transferee failure.  
3                   That said, the factors described in Sections II-IV are also very important: It is  
4                   essential, for example, that the Transferee demonstrate that it is (and will  
5                   remain) both technically and financially able to complete the work, and that it  
6                   is properly incentivized (with clear and otherwise robust “carrots” and “sticks”  
7                   throughout the period of the work). It is important that the work be supported  
8                   by clear, robust and independently-provided insurance and other financial  
9                   assurance tools. And, finally, it is critical that transparency with respect to the  
10                  transfer documents at least as great as that provided in BRAC transfers be  
11                  provided to regulators and the public in advance of the transfer, and that, on an  
12                  ongoing basis with respect to work progress, regulators be given access to  
13                  documents as (or equivalent to) trust beneficiaries unfettered by claims of  
14                  privilege or other protections.

15   **Q11. Does that conclude your testimony at this time?**

16   A11.     Yes.